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FOREWORD 
The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
is preparing a Handbook of Systems ~nal~sis, which will appear 
in three volumes: 
a Volume 1: Overview is aimed at a widely varied audience 
of producers and users of systems analysis studies. 
a Volume 2: Methods is aimed at systems analysts and other 
members of systems analysis teams who need basic knowledge of 
methods in which they are not expert; this volume contains 
introductory overviews of such methods. 
a Volume 3: Cases contains descriptions of actual systems 
analyses that illustrate the diversity of the contexts and 
methods of systems analysis. 
Drafts of the material for Volume 1 are being widely 
circulated for comment and suggested improvement. This Working 
Paper is the current draft of Chapter 1 .  Correspondence is 
invited. 
Volume 1 will consist of the following ten chapters: 
1. The context, nature, and use of systems analysis 
2. The genesis of applied systems analysis 
3. Examples of applied'systems analysis 
4. The methods of applied systems analysis: An 
introduction and overview 
5. Formulating problems for systems analysis 
6. Objectives, constraints, and alternatives 
7. Predicting the consequences: Models and mod.eling 
8. Guidance for decision 
9. Implementation 
10. The practice of -applied systems analysis 
To these ten chapters will be added a glossary of systems analysis 
terms and a bibliography of basic works in the field. 
12 October 1981 
Hugh J. Miser 
I IASA 
A-2361 Laxenburg 
Austria 
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CHAPTER 1. THE CONTEXT, NAIZTRIE. AND USE OF SrSTEXS ANALYSIS 
Edward S .  Quade and Hugh'J. Miser 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Many of the functions of society involve structures that can be thought of as 
systems combining people and the natural environment with various artifacts of 
man and his technology. Such sociotechmcal systems abound in modern 
society: the highway traffic systems, combining drivers and passengers, pedes- 
trians, highways, vehicles, the customs and rules of the road, the weather, and 
the surrounding environment; the energy system of a country, combining 
sources of energy, the means for converting these sources to  usable forms, the 
distribution devices and procedures, the using community and the ways it 
employs energy, and the surroundirg natural and economic environment that 
affects energy use and that is, in turn, affected by the energy system; urban set- 
tlements, combimng people and their dwellings in a natural environment, their 
enterprises, their social services, their means of transportation and entertain- 
ment, their economic means for exchanging their own labor for products, the 
laws and customs that  govern the system's behavior, and the organizational 
structures that  make the whole work; business enterprises, bringing together 
capital, labor, management, and specialized knowledge to create products 
desired by the society in which the enterprise is embedded; and large 
governmental structures, with their purposes, constituencies, services, funding 
needs, and relations to the public. 
Many elements of such systems exhibit forms of regular behavior, and 
scientific scrutiny has yielded much knowledge about these regularities. Thus, 
many problems that arise in sociotechnical systems can be addressed by focus- 
ing such knowledge in appropriate ways by means of the logical, quantitative, 
and structural tools of modern science and technology. The craft that does this 
is called systems analysis in t h s  handbook: it brings to bear on sociotechnical 
problems the knowledge and methods. of modern science and technology, in 
combination with concepts of social goals and equities, elements of judgment 
and taste, and appropriate consideration of the larger contexts and uncertain- 
ties that inevitably attend such problems. 
The central purpose of systems analysis is to help public and private policy 
makers to solve the problems and resolve the policy issues that they face. It 
does this by improving the basis for their judgment by generating information 
and marshaling evidence bearing on their problems, and, in particular, on possi- 
ble actions that may be suggested to alleviate them. Thus, commonly, a sys- 
tems analysis focuses on a problem arising from the operations of a sociotechni- 
cal system, considers various responses to this problem, and supplies evidence 
about the costs, benefits, and other consequences of these responses. 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an introductory description of sys- 
tems analysis. To this end, it contains discussions of the kinds of issues and 
problems that systems analysis addresses, the kinds of complexities and diffi- 
culties that arise, the central characteristics of a systems analysis, the role that 
science and technology play in systems analysis, what it does, where it finds 
application, the value that it has for society and those responsible for solvlng its 
problems, and the ar t  of carrying through a systems analysis. The later 
chapters of thls handbook extend the discussions of these points. 
2. THE CONTEXT 
Systems analysis can be applied to a wide range of hghly diverse problems, 
and the patterns of analysis exhlbit a corresponding diversity, depending on the 
context, the nature of the problem, the possible courses of action, the informa- 
tion needed, the accompanying constraints and uncertainties, and the persons 
who may use its results. 
To dus t r a t e  this diversity, this section describes several problems to whch 
systems analysis has been applied: improving blood availability and utilization, 
improving fire protection, protecting an estuary from flooding, acheving ade- 
quate amounts of energy for the long-range future, providing housing for low- 
income families in the United States, and controlling a forest pest in Canada. 
Improving blood availability and utilization. Human blood, a living tissue 
of unique medical value, is a perishable product: in the US it has a legal lifetime 
of 21 days, during which i t  can be used for transfusion to a patient of the same 
type, and after which it has to be discarded. It is collected in units of one pint 
from volunteer donors at various collection sites such as a Regional Blood 
Center (RBC), and after a series of typing and screening tests it is shipped to 
Hospital Blood Banks (HBBs) in the region of the RBC. Once at  the HBB, a unit is 
stored and is available to satisfy the random daily demand for transfusions to 
patients. Since not all units demanded and assigned to  a patient are  generally 
used, a unit can be issued several times during its lifetime until transfused or 
outdated and discarded. 
The efficient management of blood resources in a region is a difficult task. 
The blood distribution problem is complex, owing to blood's perishability, to the 
uncertainties involved in its availability to  the RBC, and to the random nature of 
the demands and usages at  each of the HBBs. Superimposed on these complexi- 
ties are  the large variations in the sizes of the hospitals-and therefore the 
HBBs-to be supplied, in the relative occurrences of the eight different blood 
groups, and in the mix of whole blood and red blood cells called for. Finally, on 
the one hand there is the imperative of having blood available when and where 
needed (while elective surgery can be postponed because of a blood shortage, 
this act incurs additional costs for all concerned), while on the other hand there 
is the desire to operate efficiently and economically. 
The two most common performance measures for an  HBB are  the shortage 
rate (that is, the proportion of days when supplementary unscheduled deliveries 
have to be made to satisfy the hospital's demand) and the outdate rate ( that  is, 
the proportion of the hospital's blood supply that is discarded owing to  its 
becoming outdated); and suitable calculations will convert these measures for 
hospitals t o  similar ones for a region. For example, a number of years ago, it 
was common for regional outdate rates to be 0.20. 
In 1979 two systems analysts in the United States reported a study that  
went most of the way toward solving this problem of managing blood supplies 
efficiently. After studying the  patterns of demand and supply, they were able to 
characterize the situation with relatively simple models, on the basis of w hch  
they were able t o  devise a decision support system for an RBC that  addresses 
these questions: What are  the minimum achievable outdate and shortage rates 
that can be set for the region? What distribution policy will achieve these tar- 
gets? What levels of supply are  needed to achieve alternative targets? 
The blood management system they devised was characterized by central- 
ized management a t  the RBC, prescheduled deliveries to the  HBBs supple- 
mented by emergency deliveries when needed, and a distribution policy accord- 
ing to wh c h  some blood is rotated among the hospitals. The operation of this 
system is based on a mathematical programming model whose objective is to 
optimize the allocation of the regional blood resources while observing policy 
constraints. 
The final step was to implement t h s  Programmed Blood Distribution Sys- 
tem (PBDS) in a trial region on Long Island, near New York City. Before PBDS 
came into effect ,  a n  average of 7.8 blood deliveries were made per week to each 
hospital in the region, all unscheduled, and the outdate ra te  was 0.20. After 
PBDS was implemented, the average number of deliveries dropped to  4.2, of 
which only 1.4 were unscheduled, and the average outdate rate fell to 0.04, 
which appears to be about the lowest possible for this situation (some wastage 
being an inevitable consequence of the random demand and limited supply). 
These management improvements represented substantial cost savings. 
Finally, the analysts designed the PBDS so that it can easily be adapted to 
new regions, and such adaptations are now in progress. 
Chapter 3 describes this outstandingly successful example of systems 
analysis in somewhat more detail. 
Improving fire protection. Fire protection is a basic municipal service. In 
the face of significant increases in demands for firefighting services, the size of 
the tirefighting force and its distribution throughout a city impose important 
policy decisions on a city government: How many fire companies to support, 
where to locate them, and how to dispatch them. A policy that leads to rapid 
responses with appropriate firefighting resources can save lives and reduce pro- 
perty losses significantly. 
The trouble is that there is little agreement on just what is "appropriate." 
In order to evaluate alternative deployment policies, both performance meas- 
ures and models to use in calculating values of the measures are needed. For- 
tunately, in the 1970s a team of systems analysts in New York City was develop- 
ing such measures and models, which they have been able to apply in several 
cities. 
The fundamental difficulty faced by the analysts was that for t h s  context 
there are no simple performance measures that can be used, such as the 
directly observable shortage and outdate rates in the case of blood manage- 
ment. 
Since a tire department's primary objectives are to protect lives and safe- 
guard property, the most important measures of its performance are the 
numbers of fire fatalities and injuries, and the value of property lost in fires. It 
is not possible, however, to use these measures to evaluate different deployment 
policies because there are as yet no reliable ways to estimate the effects that 
different policies have on them. For example, if the number of fire companies 
on duty were doubled (or halved), no one can say with a satisfactory degree of 
confidence what effect the change would have on the number of fire casualties 
or property losses. The direction of the effects on these measures may be 
predictable for large changes, such as doubling or halving, but the quantitative 
(practical) consequences are not-and in the case of more realistic small 
changes in deployment policy, neither the direction nor the size of the change in 
casualties or damage is predictable. 
Therefore, in order to evaluate alternative firehouse configurations, the 
analysts developed three substitute, or "proxy," measures, the first two of which 
- 
are directly related to loss of life and property damage: (1) travel time to indivi- 
dual locations, (2) average travel time in a region, and (3) company workload. 
Changes in the numbers of firehouses and their locations have consequences 
that appear as  changes in the values of these measures. The consequences can 
therefore be evaluated against the background of other considerations, such as 
hazards, fire incidence, costs, and political constraints. 
The analysis team put its approach to work in an assessment of the fire- 
f~ghting deployment in the City of Wilmington, Delaware, USA. In 1973 Wilming- 
ton had eight firehouses, all but one of whch antedated 1910. This fact, 
together with the city's growth and evolution, suggested a fundamental reexami- 
nation of the firefighting deployment, which was undertaken. 
In conducting such a study a great deal of data must be collected about the 
city and its fire an.d firefighting experience, but, for our present purposes the 
two chef categories are travel times from one location to another in the city 
and the demand for firefighting services (fire alarms and actual fires). 
With this information in hand the analysts proceeded to their analysis, using 
principally three tools that had already been developed. 
1. A simple formula for the relation between travel time and distance, 
valid in spite of the pattern idiosyncrasies of the city. 
2. A Parametric Allocation Model that determined fire company alloca- 
tions that would satisty a wide range of objectives and permit them to be 
evaluated in terms of average regional travel times, average citywide travel 
t.imes, and company workload. This model incorporates a simple formula that 
specifies the number of companies that should be allocated to each region, 
given the total number of companies to be deployed in the city and a parameter 
that reflects the desired objective. 
3. The Firehouse Site Evaluation Model, which dealt with the question, 
given a particular number of engine and ladder companies to be deployed in a 
region, where should they be located? 
Perhaps the most important fact for us to note about these models is that 
they do not allow the analysts to retire to an ivory tower to select the optimal 
configuration for the city. Rat-her, they must be used cooperatively with the city 
officials who can specify objectives that should be met, and who can judge the 
worth, not only of the values of the proxy output measures calculated by the 
analysts for the options explored, but also the many other factors bearing on 
the possibilities that are not embodied in the models. 
For Wilmington, the results of the analysis suggested that the number of 
engine companies could be reduced by one or two and that the remainder could 
be repositioned with little effect on fire protection. Finally, the recommenda- 
tion was that one company be eliminated and five of the remaining seven be 
relocated. 
Tbs  recommendation was adopted, but then followed by lengthy negotia- 
tions with the firemen involved, which were successful. The result is a firefight- 
ing force as effective as  before, but with the costs significantly reduced. 
Chapter 3 discusses this case in more detail. 
Protecting an estuary from flooding. In 1953 a severe North Sea storm 
flooded much of the delta region of the Netherlands, killing several thousand 
people. Determined not to allow this to happen again, the government started a 
program to increase the protection from flooding by constructing a new system 
of dams and dikes. By the mid-19701s, this system was complete except for pro- 
tecting the largest estuary, the Oosterschelde. Three alternatives for this task 
were under consideration: building an impermeable dam to close off the estu- 
ary from the sea, building a flow-through dam with gates that could be closed 
during a storm, and building large new dikes around the estuary. 
In 1975 the Netherlands Rijkswaterstaat ( the government agency responsi- 
ble for water control and public works) and the Rand Corporation of Santa Mon- 
ica, California, began a joint systems-analysis project with a view to helping 
decide what should be done. It set out to determine the major consequences 
that would follow from implementing each of the three alternatives for protect- 
ing the estuary. These consequences, called impacts, were grouped into 
categories such as financial costs, security from flooding, effects on jobs and 
profits in the fishing industry, changes in recreational opportunities, savings to 
carriers and customers of the inland shipping industry, changes in production, 
jobs, and imports for the 35 industrial sectors of the national economy, changes 
in the species and their populations that comprise the ecology of the region, 
and, finally, as social impacts, the displacement of households and activities and 
the disproportionate effects on the regional economies. A major uncertainty 
was the severity and frequency of the super-storms that make the provisions for 
protection necessary. Not surprisingly, no one of the three alternatives turned 
out to be uniformly better or worse than the others when the full range of 
impacts was co~cidered.  
By intention, the study did not conclude by recomm.ending a particular 
alternative. Rather, it clarified the issues by comparing, in a common frame- 
work, the many different impacts of the alternatives, but left the choice among 
the alternatives to the political process, where the responsibility properly 
resides. There was no dominant alternative; rather,  each was found to have a 
major disadvantage that  might be considered serious enough to render the 
alternative politically unacceptable: The storm-surge barrier alternative ( that  
is, the flow-through dam) was by far the most costly, the impermeable dam was 
the worst for the ecology, and the open case with new dikes around the  estuary 
lacked security. 
The Hijkswaterstaat supplemented this work with several special studies of 
its own and submitted its report to the Cabinet, which recommended the more 
costly storm-surge barrier plan. 
Chapter 3 offers a more extended discussion of this work. 
Achieving adequate amounts of energy for the long-range future. The goal 
of systems analysis is to  be as comprehensively relevant as feasible, and to  pro- 
duce findings that  a re  as completely specified as  the practical need dictates. 
However, such precision is possible only when the analysts have scientific 
knowledge that  is sufficiently comprehensive to make a complete and strong 
foundation for the  analysis and its results. Regrettably, all too often the 
knowledge is partial or sketchy, o r  even nonexistent, especially in cases looking 
far into the future or where the system of concern depends on the actions of 
individuals or social groups whose behavior is not yet well understood by sci- 
ence. In such cases, a model encompassing the full problem cannot be con- 
structed, but, nevertheless, systems analysis can make important contributions 
to knowledge and policy. One approach to the problems of a sociotechmcal sys- 
tem whose complexities are  not fully understood. is shown by the next example. 
Wolf Haefele and a group of colleagues a t  IIASA have completed a n  inquiry 
into the long-range energy strategies that the world should pursue. Rather than 
attempt to design a global energy policy, their more modest aim was to  provide 
information on energy t o  the world's nations, so that through their actions, 
alone or in concert, a n  equitable and far-sighted policy will evolve. Here, in 
place of the relatively simple blood-supply system of a previous example, we are 
confronted with complex interactions among the technologies, economies, 
environments, resources, people, social attitudes, and ambitions of many 
nations. Instead of a relatively homogeneous region, we have the full globe. And 
in place of relatively few decisionmakers, we have a very large number of 
independent policy makers in private industry and national governments, and in 
international enterprises and organizations. 
The role of systems analysis in this setting is not to determine a single best 
policy for a single decisionmaker, but to provide a broad perspective for auto- 
nomous decisionmakers to use in making their choices. The analytic approach 
is to identify and improve our understanding of the important interactions 
among energy-system components, among the policies of nations and industries. 
and among energy choices over time for the next fifty years or more. Many 
models are involved and the work demands much data collection and many ana- 
lyses. 
Rather than a single comprehensive computational model-impossible 
because of the lack of knowledge and the sheer size and complexity of the world 
energy sys tern-Haefele and h s  team constructed an overlapping, interlinked 
series of investigations of such subquestions as: 
What will the evolving pattern of demand for energy be? 
What resources will be available to satisfy the demand? 
What technological options will be feasible? 
What constraints will limit selections among the options? 
Instead of a quantitative evaluation of alternative policies, the analysis 
team identified a spectrum of strategies responsive to different possible 
national, international, and industrial goals. As in many analyses, the analysts 
sought a synthesis-the invention and design of new alternatives, courses of 
action that will satisfy specified demands and constraints and achieve given 
goals as nearly as possible. The hope is that, armed with this knowledge, and the 
new alternatives emerging from the work, many decisionmakers will choose 
improved policies, not from their short-term parochial standpoints, but also 
from a broad systemic viewpoint. 
Chapter 3 gives a fuller account of this study of the future of the world's 
energy system. 
Providing housing for low-income families. Still other approaches may be 
necessary in certain problems. For instance, a policy maker may feel a need to 
intervene in a social situation but must avoid introducing extraordinary disrup- 
tion or creating a costly program that, if i t  fails to  achieve its purpose, may 
become politically impossible to discontinue. For such a situation, a social 
experiment may be the technique to apply since, of all methods, controlled 
experiments allow the strongest inferences about causality. 
Consider the systems analysis based on a carefully planned experiment now 
(1980) being carried out under contract for the United States Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HuD). Its purposes are to evaluate the idea of 
providing housing assistance to low-income families by means of direct cash 
payments and to predict market and community responses to a full-scale hous- 
mg assistance program of thls type. 
For more than 40 years, United States policy makers have sought to find 
ways of providing housing assistance to low-income families that would be cost- 
effective, efficient, and equitable. Rental housing built and operated by local 
authorities, privately owned housing leased by public authorities, mortgage- 
interest subsidies to private landlords on behalf of their tenants, interest subsi- 
dies to low-income home purchasers, and other schemes have been suggested, 
argued about, analyzed, and, in some cases, even tried out, with results that  
have not warranted their large-scale adoption. In the early 1970's the idea of 
direct cash payments became prominent. I t  looked good on paper, but there 
was considerable opposition, based on disparate predictions as to how it would 
affect the housing market and the communities in which it would operate. Many 
feared an escalation of rents, speculation in real estate, rapid turnover of neigh- 
borhoods, and hostility from those who would not be allowed to  benefit from the 
program. Some foresaw that  it would lead to  deteriorating neighborhoods, some 
were afraid it would hasten racial integration, others that it would reinforce 
segregation. Consequently, the analysts proposed an experiment to gather the 
key information for their systems analysis. 
An analysis contractor designed a controlled social experiment and 
launched it in two metropolitan areas in the midwestern United States. The 
areas were chosen tor contrasts in housing-market characteristics such as 
vacancy rates and residential segregation. Nearly 15,000 households were 
enrolled by the third year of the program. 
Data from the experiment, plus market data collected as part of the 
analysis, provide a basis for measuring how the attempts of program partici- 
pants to improve their housing affect rents, housing prices, and housing quality 
in the experimental sites; how local businesses and institutions respond to the 
program's addition to low-income demand; how participants move and how their 
neighborhoods are affected; and how community and nonparticipant attitudes 
are changed. Since the experiment is not yet completed, it is too early for 
many conclusions. However, the predictions of extreme changes turned out to 
be wrong. At neither site has there been a significant disturbance of the housing 
market or of neighborhood settlement problems, and a t  both sites the program 
is generally approved by public officials, civic leaders, landlords, real-estate 
brokers, mortgage lenders, and most citizens who know of it. 
Lowry (1977) summarizes the key features of this experiment and its early 
results. 
Controlling a forest pest- in Canada. Some systems problems are charac- 
terized, not only by limited knowledge, but also by short time horizons over 
which reliable predictions can be made and conflicting interests that cannot be 
resolved by bringing them under a common administrative framework. A 
forest-pest control problem studied by C.S. Holling and a team of analysts from 
IlASA and the University of British Columbia provides an example. 
The boreal forests of North America are devastated periodically by a defoli- 
atlng insect called the spruce budworm. An outbreak can kill a large proportion 
of the mature softwood forest, with major consequences to employment and the 
economy of the region. Extensive spraying has succeeded in reducing tree mor- 
tality, but at  the expense of maintaining incipient outbreak conditions over a 
considerably more extensive area. 
The problem, as originally conceived, was to investigate and design alterna- 
tive policies, to be implemented by the government, logging enterprises, and 
landowners, and to  evaluate their effectivenesses in controlling the spruce 
budworm. The study objective was to  determine which policies should be 
adopted in order to achieve the most desirable consequences. 
These policies, which involve decisions about t ree  planting, cutting, and 
spraying, are difficult to formulate, because any change in such policies yields a 
new pattern of budworm infestation and tree growth and a changed harvest, 
affecting economic costs and benefits for individuals, business, and government; 
there are  also social and recreational impacts on people less directly con- 
cerned. 
Without systems analysis, or its equivalent under some other name, the 
decisionmakers would have had to rely upon their intuitions and thelr previous 
experiences-perhaps supplemented by opinions from specialized experts-to 
design policies and to select the most promising for implementation. But intui- 
bon, experience, and specialist opinion are severely limited when systems have 
complex interactions spaced widely in distance and in time, as  the budworm- 
forest system does. 
Systems analysis is able to provide help in the budworm case because biolo- 
gists, foresters, and ecologists have learned enough about the spruce forest and 
the budworm to be able, under most conditions, to  predict their responses to 
changes in the environment. Holling and hs colleagues have used this 
knowledge to construct an  interrelated set  of models that  enable computer cal- 
culations to  simulate with acceptable accuracy the behavior of the forest and 
the budworm under a broad range of changing conditions. These models make it 
possible to try out, by means of computer simulation, many policies that  could 
be proposed. While the models cannot guarantee that their predict~ons will  be 
the results that would occur were the policy to be implemented in the real 
forest, checking the model with historical data has given its users confidence in 
its predictions. With the information provided by t h s  analysis, the decisionmak- 
ers are in a better position to select from the options they face the one that  
best serves their needs. 
Recently, owing to the analogies that t h s  work offers with other pest- 
control and environmental problems, Holling and his colleagues have broadened 
their interests to include environmental management in general. However, 
because of the uncertainties and knowledge gaps that have attended this 
broadened inquiry, their emphasis has moved away from set  and well described 
policies toward more flexible "adaptive policies," as described in a volume edited 
by Holling (1 976). 
In recent years, Holling and his team have devised a workshop approach 
that involves representatives of key interests in an  interaction with the analysts 
and their models periodically over as much as a year to  evolve common under- 
standings and both preferred and acceptable courses of feasible action leading 
to desirable objectives. Ezpect the Unezpected: An Adaptive Approach to  
E'nvironmental Management, IIASA Executive Report 1, issued in 1979 offers an  
introduction to this approach. 
Checkland (1981) has pioneered a similar approach to  the problems of busi- 
ness firms. 
Both of these developments a re  harbingers of the day when systems 
analysis will have extended its frontiers well beyond its presently well under- 
stood arena of sociotechnical systems to systems in which individual human 
behavior is much more dominant than in the ones usually studied today-and 
which are  the  central focus of t h s  Handbook. 
3. THE NATURE OF T)iE PROBUMS 
These examples all deal with sociotechnical systems: The blood-supply sys- 
tem consists of the human donors, the Regional Blood Centers, the Hospital 
Blood Banks, and the hospitals and patients using the blood, as well as the medi- 
cal and administrative staffs who manage these activities; the firefighting sys- 
tem consists of the city and its population, the fires that occur and their proper- 
ties, the firefighting forces, the city administration, and the weather conditions 
in which the activities are embedded; the forest-pest control analysis dealt with 
a system consisting of 'the forest, the insect pest, the lumbering industry, and 
the economy and society of the region, all embedded in the area's environment; 
the world's energy system consists of the sources of energy, the means of 
transforming them into practically usable forms, the ways of transporting the 
energy to the points of use, the economies of the world's nations, the population 
of energy users, and the operations that energy fuels, all embedded in the 
natural environment that affects energy use, and that is, in turn, affected by the 
way the energy is used; the housing-assistance experiments operate in urban 
areas-and hence are embedded in their operations and economies-and include 
the housing units, the families occupying them, the owners of the units, and the 
communities in whch they are located; the Netherlands flood-control system 
includes not only the sea, the land, and the engineering works aimed at  control- 
ling floods, but also the population of the region and its operations, the ecology 
of the area, and the Netherlands economy, all embedded in the social and 
natural environment of the region. 
All of the cases exhlbit phenomena widely distributed in both space and 
time: the pest-control study considered an area of 4.5 million hectares and. 
because the intervals between outbreaks of the forest pest range from 30 to 45 
years, a time period of from 80 to  160 years; the energy study considered the 
entire world's production and consumption of energy between now and 50 years 
into the future. 
In each of the cases many variables had to be considered-so many, indeed, 
that it is neither feasible nor desirable to attempt to set forth even an abridged 
list here. However, Chapter 3, where four of these examples are discussed more 
fully, gives an idea of the principal issues and variables considered. 
From these cases, one can also imagine how, as one considers what may 
appear to be a simple problem, the aspects that need to be considered proli- 
ferate. For example, the spruce budworm is a damaging forest pest, and the 
"obvious" thmg to do to reduce the damage it causes is to attack it. However, a 
spraying program against the pest, although successful in reducing its damage 
to the forest in the sprayed areas, was found to have a number of unhappy 
effects: the area of incipient outbreak widened significantly and the spray pro- 
duced undesirable environmental effects, including threats to human health. 
Thus, it became necessary to consider the budworm cycle in its forest habitat in 
some detail, which involved the analysts in the forest's natural cycle. Then, 
since an important reason to preserve the forest is to enable the lumber indus- 
try to remain healthy and productive, one must consider it, and hence the econ- 
omy of the region to which it is an important contributor, particularly since the 
cost of any forest-management program must be levied against the resources of 
the region through taxes or otherwise. And so on. 
The complexities of each of these problems, and the large numbers of peo- 
ple concerned with how they are solved, make it clear that many decisionmak- 
ers are involved, many people's interests are affected, and many constituencies 
may have competing objectives (for example, environmentalists may want to 
preserve the beauty and integrity of the forests, whde lumbermen want to have 
its timber available for cutting). 
And all of the problems are attended by many uncertainties: weather pat- 
terns affect the sea's threat to the coastline regions of the Netherlands, as well 
as the spruce budworm cycle; unforeseen political and technical developments 
will almost certainly impact the world's energy situation in the future. Indeed, 
uncertainties are quite often present, and frequently irremovable, particularly 
when they arise from the natural environment or the goals of individuals, social 
groups, and countries. 
Against this background of complications, the analyst seeking a successful 
application of systems analysis may have to overcome one or more of these diffi- 
culties: 
Inadequate knowledge and data 
Sometimes, even though the problem may be of long standing, data may be 
lacking or incorrect, cause-and-effect relations may be obscure, and no 
relevant literature or even theory from which to s tar t  may exist. Those with 
responsibilities lor resolving the problem may have no mental model of 
processes involved and thus lack an intuitive feeling as to  the outcome. Well- 
known "facts" may be wrong. As Holling observes (19'78, page 97): "The 
[budworm] model predicted that the forest would decline independently of 
insect damage, whle it was 'common knowledge' that volume was high and would 
remain so if insects were controlled. We spent 2 months checking the model for 
errors when we should have been spending 2 days looking a t  the available raw 
data on forest volume. When we belatedly took t h s  obvious step, the model was 
vindicated." 
Many disciplines involved 
Most sociotechnical-system problems require scientific and technical 
knowledge from many different specialties. A multidisciplinary team is needed, 
a situation fraught with difficulties, for true interdisciplinary work is often hard 
to carry out. For example, the forest-pest analysis and the ensuing work of 
applying its findings required inputs from biology, zoology, forestry, mathemat- 
ics, operations research, ecology, business, economics, and public administra- 
tion, among others-and professionals in all these fields participated in the work. 
Inadequate exist- approaches 
When this is the case new methods may have to be invented, developed, and 
tested. Existing approaches have frequently been developed within a smgle dis- 
cipline by borrowing ideas from other disciplines without truly integrating them. 
A trial-and-error approach may be available theoretically, but, as a practical 
matter, it may be prohibitively costly or too risky. 
Unclear goals and objectives 
To help decision and policy makers it is crucial to know what -they want. 
Whle they usually have an idea of what is desirable, their statements of goals 
are often too vague to serve as useful guides to systems analysis, or as criteria 
to guide one's judgments of how well actions and programs serve the goals. 
Indeed, a politician may find an advantage in keeping his true goals concealed, 
or so general that  they have no operational significance. However, in general, 
goals are a subject people find difficult to think about and make explicit. Thus, 
one of the early tasks of a systems analysis is often to evolve with those con- 
cerned reasonably explicit statements of goals-even though the light shed on 
them as the systems analysis proceeds may suggest their revision, particularly 
since one frequently cannot decide what he wants to do until he has some idea of 
what can be done and what it will cost. 
Pluralistic responsibilities 
It almost always happens that, for a problem sufficiently complicated to call 
for a systems-analysis approach, there are many persons and organizational 
units with relevant responsibilities and authorities. All six of the examples illus- 
trate this point. 
Resistance to change in social systems 
Resistance to change is a property of social systems so common as to 
hardly call for comment. However, it is worth noting that  many forms of institu- 
tional structure and government are deliberately designed so as to be resistant 
to change, so that  they will survive even fairly strong perturbations intact. 
Thus, this fact is an important one for the systems analyst to consider, and his 
results-usually urging changes in response to the problems that prompted the 
analysis in the first place-must take careful account of t h s  resistance if they 
are to find acceptance and usefulness. 
The examples we have so far considered all illustrate the complexity of 
sociotechnical systems. Indeed, it is this complexity that calls for systems 
analysis to come into play. Thus, one can say that  complexity is a characteristic 
property of the sociotechnical-system problems for which systems analysis is an 
appropriate approach-and, therefore, the analysis will itself be complex. 
Ths  listing of difficult properties of sociotechnical systems is not intended 
to discourage; rather,  i t  is meant to underscore the importance of having an  
approach to the problems of such systems that has proven usefulness. The h s -  
tory of systems analysis offers many cases where this approach has helped deci- 
sion and policy makers with their problems-and, unfortunately, some cases 
where the hoped-for benefits have not accrued. It is the purpose of t h s  Hand-  
book to  capture the lessons of this hs tory,  and thus offer its readers information 
about ways to approach such problems successfully, techniques that can help 
solve them, procedures for seeing the solutions into practice, and pitfalls that 
should be avoided in the work. Indeed, i t  is the difficulties that  this section has 
sketched that have undoubtedly made the development of systems analysis 
come so late in the world's intellectual history-and that provide the rationale 
and potential usefulness of this Handbook.  
4. THE CHARACl'ERISTlCS OF SrSTEMS ANALYSIS 
Systems analysis is the multidisciplinary problem-solving activity that 
analysts have evolved t o  deal with the problems of sociotechnical systems. I t  
did not emerge quickly in response to an  appreciation of the importance of such 
problems; rather, as Chapter 2 shows, it grew on the foundations built by many 
specialties that dealt with simpler and less taxing aspects of such systems. 
I t  is neither possible nor desirable to define systems analysis in concise and 
comprehensive terms. Since systems analysis deals with diverse problems and 
different systems, it assumes many forms adapted to the problems, the 
systems, and their administrative contexts. To achieve its full growth and use- 
fulness it must continue this process of adaptation and extension, which should 
not be inhibited by too narrow a conception of what it is or how it fits into the 
social process of problem solving. 
On the other hand, it is useful to describe common features that character- 
ize systems analysis: 
Context-the operations and problems of sociotechnical systems 
Method-a synthesis of understanding, invention, analysis, design, intui- 
tion, and judgment. 
Tools-those of logic, statistics, mathematics, technology, and the sci- 
ences, employed by multidisciplinary teams. 
hm- to  lead to a n  ameliorative response to  problems through programs, 
decisions, actions, and their evaluation. 
Clients-those with responsibilities for  and interests in these ameliorative 
responses. 
A complete systems analysis may involve as many as nine steps, although 
they may have only hazy borders and may occur either in parallel to some 
extent, or in an  order other than the one listed. Applied systems analyses: 
1. Marshal both the evidence relating to the problem and the scientific 
knowledge bearing on it, when necessary gathering new evidence and developing 
new knowledge. 
2. Examine critically the social purposes-of both persons and 
institutions-relating to the problem. 
3. Explore alternative ways of achieving these purposes, which often 
include designing or inventing new possibilities. 
4. Reconsider the  problem in the light of the knowledge accumulating 
during the analysis. 
5. Estimate the impacts of various possible courses of action, taking into 
consideration both the uncertain future and the organizational structures that 
must carry forward these courses of action. 
6. Compare the alternatives by applying a variety of criteria to their 
consequences. 
7 .  Present the results of the study to all concerned in a framework suit- 
able for choice. 
8. Assist in following up the actions chosen. 
9. Evaluate the results of implementing the chosen courses of action. 
The first example discussed in this chapter, which dealt with improving 
blood availability and utilization, is an excellent example that exhibits all of 
these steps; to complete this long chain the analysts took several years in 
cooperation with officials a t  many levels in the organizations with which they 
dealt. Similarly, the fire-protection example also exhbits all of these steps 
except the last, which is not mentioned in the description; the estuary- 
protection example also exhibits t h s  outline of steps (while the last two are not 
clear from the short description here, the analysis team did assist in following 
up the actions chosen, but, of course, the evaluation of the results of the final 
implementation must await completion of the engineering works it calls for). 
On the other hand, the other three examples deviate considerably from this 
outline: the long-range future energy study was forced by the myriad complica- 
tions of its context to narrow its future to  two principal scenarios (with some 
variants) projecting a world without major surprises or political upheavals, and 
only further work by national and regional teams could translate its finhngs into 
frameworks suitable- for choice; the low-income housing experiment was 
designed to get enough reliable knowledge to permit further analysis and sup- 
port reasonable short-term decisions; and the forest-pest work must await the 
slow processes of nature to  yield the evaluations that will be the bases for the 
next steps in the work. 
Indeed, although the list of steps refers repeatedly to "the problem," only a 
rather broad view of what thls word can mean allows the discussion to cover the 
currently available experience with systems analysis. For the blood-supply case, 
we may perhaps say that the problem was to reduce the shortage and outdate 
rates, a rather sharply defined problem. However, for the study of the world's 
future energy supply the situation was a great deal more complex. Originally 
the analysis team felt that fifty years would be enough to allow the world to 
effect a transition from reliance on exhaustible fossil fuels for much of its 
energy needs to renewable sources such as sunlight. However, the study itself 
showed that this was far too sanguine an expectation, so that the problem was 
changed to read somethng h e  t h s :  Is there a path we can travel over the next 
fifty years that will lead us successfully toward a sustainable energy future at  
some later time? But one notices immediately that this is a very broad and gen- 
eral statement, lacking the precision of the one for the blood-supply case. Thus, 
it is common for a systems analysis to arise from a problem situation, rather 
than a well defined problem-and, indeed, it may never get much beyond t h s ,  if 
the context is sufficiently complicated. Consequently, for "problem" in many 
cases we must understand "problem situation," a very important fact for the 
reader to bear in mind in what follows, even though we will usually speak of "the 
problem" to avoid complications in the discussion. 
The lesson to be learned from these contrasts is that systems analysis can- 
not hew to an accepted, predetermined outline, but must respond to the condi- 
tions in the problem context and exploit such opportunities for assistance to 
decisionmakers as it may offer. Similarly, the disciplines involved, the methods 
used, the forms of communication adopted, and the schedule for the work must 
all respond sympathetically to the needs of the context and the officials with 
roles to play in it.  Good systems analysis can on occasion be short and concise, 
or long and arduous; it can employ only a bit of common sense, or very compli- 
cated mathematics. 
I t  would be unfair to the reader to leave the impression from the six exam- 
ples we have described that all systems analyses have happy results. For exam- 
ple, the elfort to decide on a location for a third London Airport, a large study, 
considered a great many aspects of its problems, cost one million pounds, lasted 
more than two years, and employed an elaborate computer model; however, its 
recommendation was rejected for a variety of reasons, but partly because ~t was 
not adequately comprehensive: important environmental considerations were 
not taken into account. 
Whle it is possible to conceive of a problem of a large-scale sociotechnical 
system that lies in the hands of a single decision or policy maker, the case 
where there are pluralistic responsibilities and interests is so much more usual 
as to  be virtually characteristic. Thus, the findings of a systems analysis must, a 
fortiori, be aimed at-and be communicated to-this varied community of per- 
sons. This fact provides systems analysis with another important role: unifying 
the knowledge base, logical framework, and overall perceptions of this commun- 
ity. 
Indeed, there is a case to be made that, in many situations, a systems 
analysis is part of a social process of problem solving in which many people take 
part. In t h s  conception, the analyst affects the social and operational environ- 
ment of which he is a part ,  which in turn affects the problems that  he is asked to  
work on, and how he goes about his analysis. The argument for t h s  point of view 
has been developed by a number of advanced thinkers in the field as being an  
important aspect of the future of systems analysis; Steen Hildebrandt (1979) 
provides an excellent introduction to the point of view and the literature that 
supports it. 
5. SCIENCE AND SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 
Science and its knowledge are the cornerstone of systems analysis, but sys- 
tems analysis itself is not science. The purpose of this section, therefore, is to  
clarify the relations between science and systems analysis, and to show how 
systems analysis depends on science for its strength. 
The domain of science is the phenomena of nature in the universe and the 
world. This context includes not only the phenomena described in the classic 
sciences with which we are familiar (astronomy, physics, chemistry, psychology, 
biology, zoology, and so on), but also the less well understood phenomena of 
social and sociotechnical systems. 
John G. Kemeny (1959), in A Philosopher Looks at Science, describes the 
method of science in this way: 
As Einstein has repeatedly emphasized, Science must s tar t  with 
facts and end with facts, no matter  what theoretical structures it 
builds in between. First of all the scientist is a n  observer. Next he 
tries to  describe in complete generality what he saw, and what he 
expects to see in the future. Next he makes predictions on the basis of 
hls theories, which he checks against facts agatn. 
The most characteristic feature of the method is its cyclic nature. 
I t  starts  with facts, ends in facts, and the facts ending one cycle are 
the beginning of the next cycle. A scientist holds his theories tenta- 
tively, always prepared to abandon them if the facts do not bear out 
the predictions. If a series of observations designed to verify certain 
predictions, force us to abandon our theory, then we look for a new or 
improved theory. Thus, these facts form the fourth stage for the old 
theory as well as the first stage of the new theory. Since we expect 
that Science consists of a n  endless chain of progress, we may expect 
t h s  cyclic process to continue indefinitely. 
As a matter  of practice, the systems analyst (and many of the scientists 
who contribute knowledge to h s  work) speak of their theories as "models"-but 
the terms are synonymous. 
We then define science as the body of knowledge (or collection of facts and 
models) assembled by the method of science. The individual sciences are dis- 
tinguished by the portions of nature they are seeking explanations for, rather 
than their techniques, tools, or methodological approaches, although these may 
have somewhat characteristic associations with particular sciences. 
Workers setting out to apply the knowledge gained by science may find the 
way to use the knowledge is simple and direct; however, it is more usual for 
them to have to invent some sort of practical instrumentality to  exploit their 
knowledge. In fact, for all but quite simple problems, they have to bring 
together much such knowledge and many inventions by designing a synthesis of 
a variety of items of knowledge and adapting the individual inventions to, the new 
synthesis; almost any of today's hgh-technology artifacts (such as airliners) 
illustrate this point. 
These invention and design activities aimed a t  applying the knowledge of 
the physical sciences are what are usually meant by the term engineering. Over 
recent decades there has been a tendency for the various classic branches of 
engineering to remain closely tied to the sciences on which they depend for the  
knowledge they use. It is also important to note that  many engineering artifacts 
are involved in the sociotechnical systems that systems analysis is concerned 
with. 
However, there are newer scientific activities that are  investigating 
phenomena exhibited by sociotechnical systems that have not been incor- 
porated in older sciences; the operations-research explorations of man-machne 
operating systems are notable examples. 
Analysts looking over the scientific knowledge available during the last 
quarter century and the efforts to use this knowledge to de s~gn  solutions to 
large-scale sociotechnical-system problems saw the need for the classic and 
newer fields of science and technology to work together to solve these larger 
problems; this impetus led to systems analysis. 
Against the background of t h s  discussion, systems analysis can now be 
described as the invention and design-or engineering-art of applying scientific 
knowledge to the problems of sociotechmcal systems. 
Thus, whle systems analysis contains many scientific components, it is not 
itself a science; rather, it is a new form of engineering being applied to the prob- 
lems of large-scale sociotechnical systems-it is concerned not only with theoriz- 
ing, but also with choosing and acting. However, it uses the methods of science 
in so far as possible and strives to uphold similar traditions. That is, good prac- 
tice holds that: 
Results emerge from processes that can be duplicated by others to 
obtain the same results. 
Calculations, assumptions, data, and judgments are reported explicitly, 
and thus are subject to chechng, criticism, and disagreement. 
Conclusions are not influenced by personalities, reputations, or vested 
interests. 
Certain sciences-economics, sociology, and physics, to name a few-are 
particularly relevant to  the problems that systems analysis addresses. Other 
disciplines-logic, mathematics, engineering, and computer science, for 
instance-provide the tools. Among the latter, operations (or operational) 
research is particularly significant, because it is the discipline from whch 
modern systems analysis emerged and because i t  shares a set of tools with sys- 
te ms analysis. 
Systems analysis, as a name, may be relatively new, but it is not a new con- 
cept or activity. History records a number of past analytic efforts that, if car- 
ried out today, we would call systems analysis. The genesis of systems analysis 
as we mean it here (at least in the United States, where i t  became widespread in 
the defense and aerospace industries in the fifties and then throughout the 
federal government in the sixties) took place in the late 1940's. The term was 
coined to distinguish research then being done for the US Air Force on future 
weapon systems from operations research. The work was not operations 
research (as operations research was then understood) for both the objectives 
of the systems and the resource requirements had to be determined and the 
environment in which they would operate predicted. These inquiries were called 
"systems analyses" because they were concerned with decisions about well 
defined systems. That an analysis dealt with a "system," however, was neither 
important to its structure nor to the way what was being done differed from 
operations research. Part of the difference lay in the need to introduce long- 
term economic factors and to consider interactions between means and objec- 
tives, activities that were not then considered within the scope of operations 
research. Today, however, operations research has broadened to take into 
account these considerations and, along with systems analysis, to treat con- 
siderations of equity and other political and social concerns. 
In fact, as systems analysis is characterized in this Handbook, operations 
research, broadly defined as it is today, is essentially identical with it. Cost- 
benefit analysis, systems engineering, and prescriptive modeling are also forms 
that systems analysis can take, but, as ordinarily practiced, they are more lirn- 
ited in scope. All of these activities follow the same general approach to prob- 
lem solving and, like systems analysis, make use of many of the same discip- 
lines, particularly economics, statistics, and probability theory; they draw upon 
the same stockpile of tools-linear programming, queueing theory, and the com- 
puter, to name a few-and, when the need arises, they employ procedures such 
as predictive modeling, sensitivity testing, optimization, and decision analysis. 
Hence, where we speak of systems analysis in the following chapters, others 
might use a different name for the same activity. In the United States, this 
name could be policy analysis; in the United Kingdom, operational research. 
However, this Handbook focuses its attention on problems of systems of 
larger scale, and thus does not attempt to cover the smaller-scale problems 
often treated under these other titles. 
6. RELATED FORMS OF ANALYSIS 
One way to help make clear what systems analysis means in this sense (and 
thus in the sense in whch it developed and in the sense in whch it is now most 
mot* 
frequently used at IIASA) is to describe what it i% For one thing. it has nothng 
to do with classifying systems or with discovering properties common to 
categories of systems; these are things one might investigate in general systems 
theory or in systems science. It does not concern itself with specifying the dis- 
tinction between social systems and cultural systems, for instance. This does 
not mean, of course, that general systems theory or systems science may not be 
useful in a particular study. In fact, systems analysis need have nothing whatso- 
ever to do with any system other than the system defined by the activity itself, 
made up of the things, concepts, and relationships involved in the investigation. 
Second, modeling is not systems analysis. A system analysis is an attempt 
to discern and answer questions of importance in the choice of a decision or pol- 
icy; a model is merely a useful device in helping to obtain answers to such ques- 
tions. 
Further, systems analysis is not research for knowledge alone, nor is it 
causal analysis, concerned with discovering the nature and causes of social or 
environmental problems or the explanations of behavior, although such research 
may be necessary to a systems study. Systems analysis, in contrast, is con- 
cerned with analyzing and resolving issues arising in specific institutional con- 
texts. Systems analysis thus is often a bridge between decision makers and the 
research community. The latter, for example, may be investigating the effects 
of economic incentives on work behavior, and a systems analyst, helping deci- 
sion makers design an income maintenance program, may use t h s  research and 
thus make it known to policy makers. 
Finally, systems analysis is not a branch of applied mathematics- 
constrained optimization-or a branch of logic-the pure logic of choice-nor 
does it claim to be identical with what is sometimes called rational decision 
making or  rational problem solving, although the differences may not always be 
apparent. 
The term systems analysis, unfortunately, has several other interpreta- 
tions. Although the words "systems" and "analysis" are clearly defined and have 
about the same meaning in all languages, when put together to form "systems 
analysis," uniformity disappears. Many scientists interpret systems analysis as 
the analysis of systems-an attempt to explain the behavior of complex systems, 
that is, as the act or process of studying a system (as  a business, a manufactur- 
ing plant, a telephone network, or a physiological function) in order to define its 
purposes and discover how it works. For others i t  means general systems 
theory or systems science. For still others who read the help-wanted pages of 
American newspapers, it refers to the activity of a high-grade computer special- 
ist. A few even define systems analysis as "systematic" analysis; it is hard, how- 
ever, to think of any analysis as being other than systematic. Also in certain 
fields, such as business or psychology, systems analysis has even more special- 
ized meanings. Most commonly, however, for us and for the policy research 
community, systems analysis is interpreted as a guide to decision: a study car- 
ried out to bring about a better outcome than would have occurred without it. 
Systems analysis has been applied with varying success to a wide spectrum 
of problems, both in type and area. We have systems analyses in the field of 
education that  range from efforts to increase efficiency in the use of space by 
using computer programs to allocate classrooms for school activities to analyses 
of educational objectives; in the area of environmental protection from setting 
the length of the salmon fishing season to designing a wildlife impact reporting 
system or to choosing among alternative methods of controlling pollution. In 
concept, i t  can be applied to any sociotechnical system in whch  decisions are 
made or policy set ,  although, of course, there may be situations where another 
approach might be more appropriate. 
Systems analysis can be put to many uses, routine (optimizing a system for 
assigning police patrols) or nonroutine (working out the main feature of a hous- 
ing maintenance plan). It can be used to raise questions about, and explore the 
consistency among, objectives of different programs (whether a petroleum corn- 
pany should look to further profits from an increase in exploration or from 
diversifying into other areas beside petroleum).. It can point out directions for 
seeking new knowledge (using solar energy, for instance) and discover new uses 
for old products (adding a chemical to water to decrease friction through fire 
hoses). Systems analysis provides this help by bringing knowledge, methods, 
ideas, and procedures from the academic, scientific, and research communities 
to bear on problems faced by business, industrial, and political decision makers. 
Systems analysis often works well with budgetary decisions. The first stu- 
dies to which the name was applied were military cost-effectiveness analyses. 
That is, they were studies that sought to determine a course of action that ,  for a 
fixed budget, would most nearly achieve some desired objective, or, conversely, 
the alternative that would aclueve a given goal for the least cost. Budgetary 
decisions typically involve choices among good things; the problem is to find out 
which are better. Actually, a good many questions, both public and private, that 
require analytic help are of this type-say, for example, those involved in an 
attempt by a city fire department to provide a n  improved level of protection 
within its budget. Such questions may require for their answers little more than 
careful data collection and the skillful application of standard techniques from 
operations research and economics. These questions typically arise from the 
desire to  increase efficiency in a situation where it is clear what efficiency 
means. The situation often can be made t o  fit a well-known model such a s  linear 
programming o r  queueing theory and a near-optimal solution obtained by means 
of a systematic computational routine. 
Systems analysis has been most successful in helping with issues in whlch 
science and engineering dominate, as, for example, in many industrial and mili- 
tary applications. Here the problem has usually dealt with a completely man- 
made and directed enterprise-a manufacturing process, a weapon system, an 
airline-something that  was, or can be, designed with a clear purpose in mind 
and has a structure that  follows known laws of engineering, physical science, and 
economics. Authority is clear-cut and cooperative, ordinarily believing that 
analysis can help rather than hinder the situation, and the underlying design 
can be discovered and modeled. 
In contrast, when political, organizational, and social factors dominate, as 
they do in most public problems, as, for example, in designing a welfare system 
or in setting standards for pollution control or in defining an urban renewal pol- 
icy, goals may be obscure and conflicting and authority diffuse and overlapping, 
with no confidence that analysis can help with the solution. Dalkey (1967) sug- 
gests that,  because the underlying structure may have grown without conscious 
design, to discover the underlying model may require the same sort of profound 
digging that  is required to determine something like the role of hormones in 
regulating body functions. 
In addition, efficiency and effectiveness may have no clear meaning in such 
problems; questions of equity, and "who benefits" and "who pays" may be more 
critical to the acceptance of a proposed solution than any question of which pol- 
icy generates the greater surplus of benefits over costs. The difficulties of 
deciding what ought to be done are likely to  dwarf those of finding out how to do 
it. Nevertheless, systems analysis has helped here, even though it may not have 
offered a complete solution, by providing information, by isolating alternatives, 
and by yielding insights that have enabled decision makers to intuit better  solu- 
tions. Systems analysis of this latter type is now being called policy analysis, 
particularly in the United States, partly to avoid confusion m t h  the narrow office 
management and computer uses of the term systems analysis. 
8. THE VALUE OF SYZTEMS ANALYSIS . 
The purpose of systems analysis, as stated earlier, is t o  help (and possibly 
to influence) a decision maker to choose a better course of action in a particular 
problem situation than he might otherwise be able to select. But, to  be useful, 
the analysis does not have to provide him with a complete prescription as to 
what he should do in every conceivable contingency that might ensue. In truth,  
it cannot; the uncertainties are  usually such that, whle  the analyst may aim to 
produce facts and proofs, the results are merely evidence and arguments. But 
analysis can almost always eliminate the really bad alternatives, leaving the 
decision maker a choice from among the relatively good ones. 
Assistance to a decision maker can take a number of forms. For him, to 
decide is not enough; decisions must be accepted by other decision makers ( a  
group that often includes those who must change as a consequence of the deci- 
sion), and then be carried out. Systems analysis can help with both acceptance 
and implementation. 
So far in the history of their subject, systems analysts have mostly limited 
their help to decisionmakers and the public by trying to see that better actions 
are taken by discovering what these better actions might be, but sometimes, 
unfortunately, with "better" defined solely according to the analysts' standards; 
they have seldom tried to help by marshaling arguments and using systems 
analysis as a tool of advocacy for the better actions. However, some of the most 
significant uses of systems analysis may be obscured if we regard it simply as a 
means of producing information for the intellectual task of problem solving. 
Certainly, this is its most important function, but, particularly in the political 
arena, problem solving requires more than discovery of a good solution; it 
requires winning acceptance for this solution and seeing that  its effect is not 
nullified during the implementation process. Systems analysis can be used to 
convert perceived problems into political issues, to legitimize decisions, and to 
assemble support for proposed actions. 
Analysis before a decision, even though it is almost never adequate to 
prescribe the decision, has a number of virtues. Among other things, it: 
Introduces a certain amount of objectivity into a subjective process; 
Can take uncertainty into account explicitly; 
Considers specific issues in larger contexts and determines interactions 
and side effects; 
Tends to shift debate from means to consequences; 
May reveal unanticipated consequences of policies and actions; 
Evaluates and compares alternatives in a consistent and systematic way; 
6 May provide insight into issues and suggest better  alternatives; 
Reveals some of the linkages between objectives and feasible results. 
Analysis has a certain authority. As Harvey Brooks (1976) puts it: 
The usefulness of systems analysis depends on the fact that  its 
conclusions purport to be based on a se t  of neutral principles that 
command a wider consensus than those conclusions themselves would 
be likely to command without a demonstration that  they are  logically 
deducible from such principles. In this sense, policy or systems ana- 
lyses perform a function with respect to political-technological deci- 
sions similar to that performed by a judicial process with respect to 
conflicts between individuals. A court decision is accepted by the 
disputing parties largely because it is based on a se t  of rules both par- 
ties accept  applied through a procedure which both parties are 
prepared, before knowing its outcome, to accept as  unbiased. 
This authority can be put  to many good uses. However, it must also be 
admitted that  there are  potential ways to misuse systems analysis as well. For 
instance, in addition to what the analyst may be told is the purpose, a decision 
maker may commission a study to provide himself with an  "expert" facade for 
promoting his preconceived ideas or policies, an  excuse for inaction and delay, 
or a shield for h s  actions that  is hard to penetrate or challenge without rival 
analysis. Too, systems analysis may be misunderstood or produce misleading 
information, for example, by implying unwarranted degrees of confidence in 
oversimplified or partial results, or overemphasizing the readily treated (but 
often less important) quantitative aspects of problems while neglecting other 
attributes and values that are difficult to quantify and thus can be treated only 
by judgment. Canons ol good practice enjoin the  analyst from such misuses. 
On the other hand, systems analysis for an organization or a society, done 
properly and properly understood and acted upon, can, in the opinion of most of 
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those who had some experience with it, bring the following beneficial conse- 
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quences: 
Policies and actions that may more effectively (and/or efficiently) 
achieve the decision makers' desired objectives, with few undesirable side 
effects: 
Explicit consideration of assumptions, uncertainties, costs, conse- 
quences, spillovers, etc.  : 
An objective framework and common base for part  of the  political pro- 
cess, a separation and clarification of objective components; 
Improved understanding of the issues and hence better "intuition" on the 
part  of the decision makers; 
A logical framework for considering and setting policy goals; 
Improved managerial capabilities for planning and administration; 
A better  means-economic, political, organizational, technological-for 
setting and effecting national, regional, or institutional objectives; 
New options, new goals,and new horizons that expand people's percep- 
tions of what might be and that offer them the  chance of improving their lives. 
There are also adverse features that  may follow from dependence on ana- 
lytic methods. To minimize them, specific consideration must be given in sys- 
tems analysis t o  the possibility that they may occur. Here are examples: 
Delays in making decisions; 
Increased centralization and concentration of decision making in top- 
level staff: 
Increased dependence on complex processes (for example, computerized 
information systems) that require continuing attention by expensive talent in 
order t o  work well; 
Elirninat~on of inefficiency and redundancy that ,  while costly, may have 
scrvcd to meet unuxpecled contingencies, resulting in greater dependence on 
processes and policies lhat,  while finely tuned to specific situations, may not be 
robust or reliable under changing or "dirty" conditions. 
However.adverse consequences of these types are results of defective 
analysis or of the  improper use of analysis-and good analysts will see to it that 
such pitfalls are  avoided. I f ,  for instance, redundancy in a system is of value in 
spite of its additional cost, the analysis, when done properly, should show this to 
be the case. 
Systems analysis, like every other human endeavor, has its limitations. One 
of these is that it is of necessity incomplete; time, money, and other costs place 
severe limitations on how thoroughly any topic can be studied, but even without 
such restrictions, the analysis is incomplete. I t  simply cannot treat  all con- 
siderations that may be relevant. Problems tend to proliferate, as mentioned 
earlier, and, to  quote E.S. Quade (1975), an experienced systems analyst, there 
is no "stage a t  which we know all there is to know. We may stop because the 
re turn for effort is becoming vanishngly small, but there still will remain 
research that could be done." 
Since systems analysts are  human, and since science presents us a t  best 
with only partial knowledge of the world's phenomena, it is too much to expect 
that systems analysis can make recommendations that  are rigidly 
objective,totally free from arbitrary judgment, and completely based on sci- 
ence, even about issues that are  scientific in character. Faced with the problem 
of giving advice about such things as the effects on stratospheric oxygen of the 
nitric oxide in the exhaust of supersonic transports, or the health hazards of 
low-level radiation, or the risk of failure of the emergency core-cooling system 
of a reactor, systems analysis is not in a position to provide unambiguous 
answers. This is due in part  the fallures of today's science. But consider 
environmental standards. They have significant distributional aspects, for they 
affect people in different locations and walks of life in different ways, and 
questions of distributional equity c a ~ o t  be settled on purely scientific princi- 
ples. 
Since it is the nature of systems analysis to  explore the difficult problems 
on the frontiers of our understanding of the workings of sociotechnical systems, 
the hs tory of the subject (as Chapter 2 brings out) has been strewn with difficul- 
ties, and failures have occurred as well as successes. Thus, systems analysis is 
not without its critics; they say that  it is too complicated, that analysts are 
more interested in research than in solving real world problems, that  there is 
too much emphasis on cost, that  it is waste of money. Undoubtedly the results 
have sometimes been unusable and misleading; Hoos (1972) cites a number of 
examples. More fundamental criticisms have been expressed by Dror (1971), 
Majone (1977), Tribe (1972), and Lynn (1980). Tribe's criticisms, as stated in 
Rowen (1976), are that  policy analysis (systems analysis in our terms): 
(1) Concentrates on tangible, quantifiable factors and ignores or depreci- 
ates the importance of intangible, unquantifiable ones; 
(2) Leaves out of consideration altogether certain "fragile" values-e.g., 
ecological or aesthetic concerns; 
(3) Focuses on results and, in its search for common measures, ignores 
both the processes by which preferences and decisions are formed and signifi- 
cant qualitative differences among outcomes; 
(4) Tends to operate within limits se t  by the interests and values of the 
clients; 
(5) In the effort to be objective, employs deceptively neutral and 
detached language in dealing with intensely moral issues; 
(6) Artificially separates facts from values; and 
(7) Tends to  overlook distributional objectives in favor of efficiency objec- 
tives. 
However, these criticisms of some cases of past  practice must not be 
viewed as intrinsics of systems analysis; rather,  they are pitfalls to  be avoided in 
practicing the art of systems analysis. 
There are, of course, other means than systems analysis for helping a deci- 
sion maker. 
The policy advisor is the traditional source of advice. He may be a general- 
ist experienced in political matters or a specialist, an expert in economics, phy- 
sics, sociology, or another field. Such advisors are often well informed on the 
issues and the decision makers' preferences, but unless their assumptions and 
chain of logic are made explicit so that others can use the information and rea- 
soning to form their own considered opinion, biases and omissions may go 
undetected. The opinion of the advisor can, in fact, be very helpful, particularly 
if it results from a carefully reasoned and impartial examination of the problem 
situation with due allowance for the costs and risks. In other words, if he bases 
h s  advice on whatever analysis he can do with the resources and time available 
to him, the advlce is likely to be superior to what he might give based on intui- 
tion alone. However, such an advisor is limited to what he can do by himself. 
Committees are a second alternative, in the belief that an advisor's 
knowledge and opinions are likely to be more valuable if they can be joined with 
the knowledge and opinions of other advisors and experts to reach a consensus. 
Unfortunately, the findings of many committees are  obtained by bargaining 
rather than by reasoning, and, on a committee, personality and prestige often 
outrank logic. 
A t h r d  alternative is "muddling through," a sort of trial-and-error process 
in which naturally occurring feedback from what actually happens is supple- 
mented by limited analysis. Administrators and policy makers have long gone 
about making decisions in this way-using analysis on parts of their problem, 
taking remedial steps rather than innovative ones, moving away from ills rather 
than toward definite objectives, seeking vague goals sequentially. 
The argument that systems analysis, even though it may be incomplete, is 
to be preferred to the intuition of an expert, or to bargaining by a committee, is 
based on the belief that the results will be better, i.e., that the decision maker 
will prefer the results he gets from analysis to what he would have done without 
the analysis. We cannot prove that analysis will produce better results; sensible 
decisions are clearly possible without systems analysis, for many have been 
made. Also, it is clear that the practice of systems analysis involves a cost, and 
the cost of analysis may be greater than the cost of error.  However, the lessons 
of the history of systems analysis, and the magnitudes of the problems the world 
faces with it sociotechnical systems, argue that,  properly carried out and suit- 
ably applied, systems analysis can make important-even essential-- 
contributions to solving these problems. 
9. THE CRAFT OF ANALYSIS 
The difficulty in telling a would-be practitioner of systems analysis how to 
practice, as we try to do in this Handbook,  is that systems analysis, like scien- 
tific research and engineering practice, is to a large extent a craft activity in 
which a skilled person draws upon the knowledge and tools of many different sci- 
ences and technologies to weave together a product responsive to the needs of 
the eventual users. Unlike much of engineering, the work of the systems analyst 
(and of the scientist as well) is guided and controlled by methods that are 
mainly informal, ad hoc,  and tacit, rather than formal, public, and explicit. It is 
desirable for any presentation of the methods of systems analysis to make these 
guiding ideas as explicit as possible, but this may be impossible to do in written 
form alone. Case studies that  illustrate how an experienced analyst goes about 
his craft may help, but such studies are not easily formulated and are no substi- 
tute for on-the-job training in an  art; or craft. 
The way to carry out a systems analysis of a given problem or issue cannot 
be described by an unquestioned set  ~f rules. There is no se t  of steps for the 
analyst to follow by the numbers that will lead the decisionmakers without 
exception to the correct decision. The primary decision-what action to take-is 
the responsibility of the decisionmakers. The path to  the  primary decision, h.ow- 
ever, depends on what White (1972) calls a host of "secondary decisions" by the 
analyst, made more or less subjectively, based on intuition and experience. 
These secondary decisions include the many simplifying assumptions that must 
be made if a complex issue is to be made tractable: the choice of what aspects 
of the primary problem to leave out, the selection of a n  analytic approach, the 
extent of the sensitivity testing, and many others. Proficiency in making these 
methodological and procedural decisions is part of the craft of systems analysis, 
as discussed at length in Chapter 10. A detalled examination of the work 
sketched in the examples at the beginning of t h s  chapter would show many 
examples of the application of craft knowledge. For example, several successful 
simplifications were critical in enabling the models in the blood-supply example 
to yield easily computable results. 
In systems analysis, artistry and craftmanship are nowhere more in 
demand than during model building. Often, in constructing a model, the sys- 
tems analyst may find himself at the frontier of the state of the art .  He then 
may have to rely heavily on his judgment and intuition about whatever expertise 
may be available, rather than on solid (nonexistent) theory. The demands of 
problems in the real world require that, even if the current state of science pro- 
vides no theory, well-established or otherwise, of the phenomena to be dealt 
with, the analyst (as HelmerlStbstates) "must nevertheless construct a model as 
best he can, where both the structure of the model and its numerical inputs 
have an ad hoc quality, representing merely the best insight and information 
that the analyst happens to have available. As further insights accrue and more 
experimental data become available, the (systems) analyst has to be prepared 
to discard his first model and replace it with an  improved one. The tentative 
procedure, dictated by pragmatic considerations, is thus essentially one of suc- 
cessive approximation." A good craftsman makes this process converge to a use- 
ful model within the relevant time period. 
10. CONCLUSION 
The notion has been around for a long time that numbers and logic ought, if 
not to rule the world, at  least, to play a major role in that rule. Until recently, 
however, only a few philosophers have had much faith that this might actually 
come to pass. For the rest of us, quantitative scientific analysis admittedly had 
a place in engineering, and in science itself, but for determining decisions and 
policy in the world of affairs, i t  had very limited applications; that world would 
continue to be governed by tradition, judgment, intuition. Wisdom, insight, pers- 
everance, and politics made our leaders great,  not calculation. 
Systems analysis represents a considerable challenge to  this point of view. 
I t  offers a way to bring scientists, including those in economics and the 
behavioral disciplines, and their knowledge and methods, into domains where 
decisions have been almost the exclusive prerogative of politicians, lawyers, and 
entrepreneurs. To date systems analysis has found many applications, with 
results a t  least promising enough to  generate considerable clamor for more- 
although not without some criticism. 
Systems analysis, as we have tried to  make clear, is not a method or tech- 
nique; nor is it a fixed set  of techniques; but rather a concept, or  way of looking 
a t  a problem and bringing scientific knowledge and thought to bear on it. That 
is, i t  is a way to investigate how to best aid a decision or policy maker faced with 
complex problems of choice under uncertainty, a practical philosophy for carry- 
ing out decision-oriented interdisciplinary research, and a perspective on the 
proper use of the available tools. We have also in t h s  chapter discussed the 
type of problem with which systems analysis can deal, given an  idea of its value 
for policy makers and the public, and contrasted it with alternative sources of 
advice. 
What this chapter has not done is provide advice on how to  t o  carry out a 
systems study, how to overcome or avoid the problems and difficulties so that 
desired outcomes are attained. Except for the more technical and mathemati- 
cal tools, which are left for a later volume, t h s  advice is contained in the 
remaining chapters of this volume. 
O n e  more point should be made here. For success, systems analysis 
requires not only a competent producer but also a knowledgeable and sophisti- 
cated consumer or user. To get full benefit, the user needs to understand the 
character of policy-level research; he must, for instance, understand that find- 
ing out what needs to be studied is a crucial part of the process of applying sys- 
tems analysis to almost every problem. Consequently, the chapters in this 
volume that follow are written both for the producer and the user of systems 
analysis. 
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